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Abstract
The main contribution of this thesis is to develop an original model of competi-
tive behaviour-based price discrimination (BBPD) through targeted advertising in a
product di¤erentiated market. It also provides a review of the economic literature on
informative advertising and on oligopoly price discrimination, particularly on BBPD.
The competitive and welfare e¤ects of both marketing strategies¡i.e., BBPD and
advertising¡is already not well understood as there are few works in the …eld. One
exception is Esteves (2009) who o¤ers a …rst look at the dynamic e¤ects of BBPD in
homogeneous product markets, where …rms need to invest in advertising to generate
awareness. Broadly, this thesis extends her study to a product di¤erentiated duopoly
market. Thus, we consider a dynamic two-period model where two …rms o¤er prod-
ucts that are di¤erentiated à la Hotelling and it is assumed that through informative
advertising consumers become imperfectly informed. In the …rst period price discrim-
ination is not feasible. In the second period, based on consumers’ purchase history
…rms can employ BBPD. This dissertation investigates the competitive and welfare
e¤ects of …rms being able to price discriminate between their old and new costumers
in a product di¤erentiated market where through informative advertising consumers
become imperfectly informed. We show that moving from no discrimination to BBPD
decreases second period prices but increases …rst period prices. An important …nding
of this thesis is that BBPD boosts industry pro…ts at the expense of consumer surplus
and welfare. A common …nding in the existing literature is that when the two …rms
can price discriminate BBPD leads …rms to a prisoner’s dilemma situation. This
thesis shows that the existence of imperfect informed consumers through informative
advertising can help …rms to bene…t from BBPD.
Keywords: Behaviour-based price discrimination, informative advertising, com-
petitive and welfare e¤ects
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Resumo
O principal objectivo desta tese é desenvolver um modelo para aprofundar o con-
hecimento sobre as consequências a nível económico que derivam da capacidade das
empresas praticarem preços diferentes para consumidores que revelam histórias de
compra diferentes, fenómeno designado na literatura económica como "Behaviour-
Based Price Discrimination" (BBPD). É apresentada uma revisão de literatura para
sintetizar os diferentes estudos realizados em torno da publicidade informativa e da
discriminação de preços em oligopólio, particularmente em BBPD. Do trabalho de-
senvolvido ao nível da publicidade, o estudo dos efeitos competitivos e o bem-estar,
abrangendo estas duas estratégias de marketing (publicidade e BBPD) tem sido negli-
genciado. No entanto, os estudos iniciais sobre os efeitos dinâmicos da BBPD nascem
com Esteves (2009) que apresenta um modelo em que as empresas oferecem o mesmo
produto (produtos homogéneos) e os consumidores apenas tomam conhecimento da
existência de um produto se receberem um anúncio da empresa. Portanto, o objec-
tivo desta tese é estender o seu estudo a um duopólio com produtos diferenciados.
Tendo em consideração esse propósito é apresentado um jogo sequencial de dois perío-
dos onde as empresas oferecem produtos diferenciados “à la Hotelling”. No primeiro
período, as empresas não têm conhecimento das preferências dos consumidores e a
discriminação de preços não é viável. No segundo período, após observarem o com-
portamento dos consumidores, as empresas distinguem, de forma imperfeita, os con-
sumidores que no primeiro período compraram o seu produto ou o da empresa rival.
Como no último período a discriminação de preços é permitida, as empresas oferecem
preços diferentes a consumidores com histórias de compra distintas utilizando para
o efeito publicidade informativa direccionada. Com esta análise mostra-se que en-
quanto a BBPD diminui os preços do segundo período relativamente ao caso em que
não há discriminação, e pelo contrário, os preços do primeiro período são superiores.
Uma descoberta importante desta tese é veri…car que a BBPD impulsiona os lucros
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da indústria à custa do excedente do consumidor e do bem-estar. Uma descoberta
semelhante à literatura existente é que, quando as duas empresas podem discrimi-
nar os preços, a BBPD leva as empresas a situação do dilema do prisioneiro. Esta
tese mostra que a existência de consumidores imperfeitamente informados através de
publicidade informativa podem ajudar as empresas a bene…ciar da BBPD.
Palavras-chave: Discriminação de preços baseada no comportamento dos consum-
idores, publicidade informativa, efeitos competitivos e de bem estar.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In many markets ﬁrms need to invest in advertising. Advertising reaches consumers
thought television, radio, newspapers, magazines, billboards, passing buses, park benches,
the mail, home telephones and the ubiquitous pop-up advertisements on our computers.
The actual impact that advertising has on market is a subject of some controversy.
Some economists argue that the primary role of advertising is to provide information
about products and their prices to potential consumers. The defenders of advertising
argue that it provides consumers with useful information and encourages price com-
petition. Without advertising, it would be impossible for new ﬁrms to become aware.
Advertising, they say, promotes price competition, lowers prices and encourages a
greater range of choice for consumers.
In the economic literature there are mainly two views of advertising. The ﬁrst
view is that advertising is persuasive, its main goal is to change consumers’ tastes and
create spurious product diﬀerentiation and brand loyalty. As a consequence, it has no
“real” value for consumers, but rather induces artiﬁcial product diﬀerentiation. The
second view is that advertising is informative. According to this approach, advertising
has an important informative role to otherwise uniformed consumers. Many markets
are caracterized by consumers imperfectly informed, since search costs may deter a
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consumer from learning each product’s existence, price and/or quality. Advertising is
the endogenous response to this problem: when a ﬁrm advertises, consumers receive
information.
Regardless of the role of advertising, economists struggle with another important
question: What marketing techniques are more eﬃcient for advertisers? At this point,
it is useful to remark on some recent trends in marketing: price discrimination and
targeted advertising. Targeted advertising is meant to "target" speciﬁc advertisements
(henceforth ads) towards speciﬁc consumer groups.
The rapid advance in information technology now makes it feasible for sellers to
condition their price oﬀers on consumers’ prior purchase behavior. Innovations in web-
based contextual advertising have helped ﬁrms to sharply focus their advertising. Now
ﬁrms can selectively advertise their products to consumers based on web pages browsed
and information searched by consumers. The use of modern information technologies
has also given ﬁrms the ability to recognize customers with diﬀerent past purchasing
histories and send them targeted advertisements with diﬀerent prices. When a ﬁrm
charges diﬀerent prices for the same good or service to diﬀerent consumers, even though
there is no diﬀerence in the cost to the ﬁrm of supplying these consumers, the ﬁrm is
engaging in price discrimination. Consider the following examples. Mobile companies
can oﬀer a lower price to a customer who has been using a competitor’s service; a
credit card ﬁrm can oﬀer a lower interest rate to a consumer who transfers balance from
another credit card company; a cable company oﬀers a lower monthly free to a customer
who previously uses the satellite TV. The type of price discrimination in these examples
has two common features. First, the prices depend on consumers’past purchases, and
thus incorporate an explicit dynamic consideration. Furthermore, the information
about a consumer’s past purchase takes a particularly simple form, namely whether or
not the consumer purchased from a rival in the past. Second, ﬁrms tend to operate
under competition, often in oligopoly markets. Such price discrimination by purchase
history has been named in the literature as Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination
(BBPD) and has received much attention in the recent economic literature.
4
Several issues arise in models of behaviour-based price discrimination. The large
body of previous literature on eﬀects of price discrimination has been developed as-
suming that there is no role for advertising and that the market is fully covered. An
exception is the work of Esteves (2009a) which oﬀers a ﬁrst look at dynamic eﬀects
of customer poaching in homogeneous product markets, where advertising is used by
ﬁrms as a way to transmit relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers.
Extending this study to diﬀerentiated products would bring new interesting insights,
improving the economic understanding of BBPD in competitive markets. Thus, the
objective of this thesis is to broaden our understanding of price discrimination with
imperfectly informed consumers in product diﬀerentiated markets. With this goal in
mind this thesis extends the analysis of Esteves (2009a) to a product diﬀerentiated
market.
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 oﬀers a review of the more relevant
literature. It begins with an historical overview of the development of the economic
analysis of advertising wherein economists debate the purpose and the eﬀects of ad-
vertising. It also discusses the key initial writings that are associated which each of
two views of advertising. Then it oﬀers a brief review of the literature on competitive
price discrimination mainly on BBPD.
In order to evaluate the competitive eﬀects of BBPD two benchmark cases are
presented in chapter 3. We ﬁrst present the benchmark case where consumers are
imperfectly informed and price discrimination cannot occur either because ﬁrms have
no information about consumer preferences or because it is illegal. Then we present the
benchmark case where price discrimination is permitted but consumers are perfectly
informed.
The main contribution of this thesis can be found in Chapter 4. It develops an
original duopolistic model of product diﬀerentiation with repeated purchases where
ﬁrms need to invest in informative advertising to become known and sell their products.
We propose a two-period model in which ﬁrms choose prices and informative advertising
intensities in the ﬁrst period, and consumers make their purchasing decisions. In the
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second period, ﬁrms can distinguish between two types of consumers: those who bought
from them and those who bought from the rival. Price discrimination through targeted
advertising becomes possible. Here we investigate the competitive and welfare eﬀects
of price BBPD through advertising and show that new insights arise in comparison to
Esteves (2009). Finally chapter 5 presents the thesis’ main conclusions.
1.2 Related Literature
This thesis is mainly related to two strains of the economic literature. One is the
literature on informative advertising; the other is the recent literature on competitive
price discrimination, speciﬁcally the literature on behaviour-based price discrimination.
Broadly, ﬁrms use advertising to improve the information available on the mar-
ket and/or to entice consumers to buy their products. This information can be con-
veyed to consumers through the media such as internet, television, radio, newspapers,
magazines and mail. Advertising is therefore an important feature of modern economic
life. Usually it provides information on prices, quality and other attributes of the ﬁrms’
products. Although till the end of the 19th century economists had little to say about
advertising and its eﬀects on economics, a vast literature emerged during the 20th
century.
The initial studies on advertising are born with Marshall (1980, 1919) that dis-
tinguishes the constructive and the combative role of advertising. On the one hand,
he believes that advertising can play a constructive role by alerting consumers to the
existence and location of products carrying also information regarding their attributes
and qualities. On the other hand, the combative role occurs when advertising involves
repetitive messages, and whose apparent purpose is just removing consumers from one
company to the rivals.
Later, Chamberlin (1933) sought to integrate formally advertising in economic the-
ory. Chamberlim argued that a company can use advertising to diﬀerentiate its product
from the rivals’ ones. An important contribution of Chamberlim was to point to the
contradictory eﬀects of diﬀerent purposes of advertising: to inform or to persuade. In
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this way, nowadays there are two important veins of research on advertising. One is
the line of research on informative advertising, the other one is the line of research on
persuasive advertising.
According to the persuasive advertising view the main role of advertising is to
persuade consumers. By investing in advertising ﬁrms try to increase the consumers’
willingness to pay for their products. According to the informative advertising view,
advertising plays an important role by conveying relevant information such as product
existence, availability and price to otherwise uninformed customers. As Nelson (1974)
points out, advertising can serve as a tool for transmitting this information to con-
sumers and therefore should not be considered as an unnecessary activity. Whilst in
some models advertising is a sine qua non condition for demand existence, in others the
main purpose of advertising is to transmit information about price.1 The model pro-
posed in this thesis is mainly related to the former type of advertising models. Hence,
in what follows, we will focus on those models in which without advertising consumers
are left out of the market. A common research concern in these models is the welfare
eﬀects of informative. Butters (1977) investigates whether there is too much or too
little advertising. Remarkably, he ﬁnds that the market equilibrium level of advertising
is socially optimal. This result was conﬁrmed by Stahl (1994) who extended the latter
model to oligopolistic markets and with more general demand curves and advertising
technologies. Variations on Butters’s (1977) model such as the introduction of product
diﬀerentiation (Grossman and Shapiro (1984)), or heterogeneity among buyers (Stege-
man (1991)) were shown to easily oﬀset this result and helped establish the idea that
increased competition stimulated additional advertising (the business stealing eﬀect),
while the incapability of the ﬁrm to appropriate the social surplus it generates acts
as a deterrent to advertising (the nonappropriability of social surplus eﬀect, Tirole
(1988)). In addition, apart from Grossman and Shapiro (1984) who ﬁnd that in a
1Within the stream of models where consumers are imperfectly informed only about price see,
for instance, Bester and Petrakis (1995) and Moraga-González and Petrakis (1999). Basically, both
works provide a duopoly model where though consumers know the existence of both ﬁrms, they are
only informed about the price oﬀered by the neighbourhood ﬁrm. The main role of advertising is,
therefore, to transmit information about prices to consumers located at distant locations.
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diﬀerentiated-product industry there is a single price equilibrium, those authors that
have extended the Butters’s model without departing from the homogeneous product
assumption also obtain equilibrium outcomes displaying price dispersion (e.g. Stege-
man (1991) and Stahl (1994)).
The developments in information technology have enabled ﬁrms to collect and use
sophisticated databases of consumer information as a way to target speciﬁc messages to
diﬀerent types of consumers. Motivated by the information technology improvements,
recent studies on informative advertising have been assuming that ﬁrms can target
advertising messages to speciﬁc groups of consumers in a market. Hernández-Garcia
(1997) and Esteban, Gil and Hernández-Garcia (2001) study targeted advertising in
monopolistic markets. These studies have concentrated on the ability of the monopolist
to target ads to those consumers with a higher valuation for the good. Shaﬀer and
Zhang (1995), Bester and Petrakis (1996) and Moraga-González and Petrakis (1999)
look at coupon targeting in duopoly settings. Iyer, et al. (2005) look also at the
economic eﬀects of targeted advertising in a duopoly market. In their work companies
use targeted advertising to reach only those consumers who really want to buy their
products. In these studies consumers are aware of the ﬁrm/product existence and so
advertising is not needed to generate demand for a product.
The access to consumer information databases has also permitted ﬁrms to use tar-
geted advertising messages as a tool to price discriminate. In many contexts, price
discrimination emerges naturally as a dominant strategy. The simplest deﬁnition says
that price discrimination means selling the same good at diﬀerent prices. More gener-
ally price discrimination is present when two or more similar goods are sold at prices
that are in diﬀerent ratios to marginal costs (Varian, 1989, p 598).
Following the traditional deﬁnition of Pigou (1920) there are three types of price
discrimination (PD). Under ﬁrst-degree PD the ﬁrm is able to charge a diﬀerent price
per unit of product and per consumer, which under monopoly means that the ﬁrm is
able to extract all consumer surplus. Second-degree PD is the practice of discriminating
on the basis of unobserved consumer heterogeneity. The ﬁrm oﬀers a menu of products
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and prices and consumers self-select into the appropriate niche of the market. Finally
third-degree PD occurs when the ﬁrm can discriminate on the basis of observable
and veriﬁable consumer characteristics (e.g. past purchasing decisions, age, gender,
geographical location, etc.).
Recent typologies of price discrimination can now be encountered in the literature.
Stole (2007) classiﬁcation is based on whether the form of consumer heterogeneity is
observable or not. Direct price discrimination is based on some observable demand
related characteristic (e.g. third-degree, location based, behaviour-based, etc.). Indir-
ect price discrimination arises if consumer heterogeneity is not directly observable and
ﬁrms need to rely on self-selection mechanisms to indirectly separate consumers (e.g.
nonlinear pricing). Within the classiﬁcation of direct price discrimination, we can refer
the practice of charging diﬀerent prices to consumers with diﬀerent past behavior. This
form of price discrimination was introduced in the economic literature by Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000).
While the literature of price discrimination is abundant in monopoly markets the
same is not true in imperfect competitive contexts. An important ﬁnding in monopoly
settings is that price discrimination always increases the ﬁrm’s proﬁts while the eﬀect
on welfare might be positive or negative. A relevant reference on competitive price
discrimination is the paper by Thisse and Vives (1988). They examine competition
between ﬁrms that are diﬀerentiated in geographical space. Two price strategies are
presented: (i) uniform pricing and (ii) price discrimination. In the latter case they allow
ﬁrms to set a diﬀerent price to each consumer location. With price discrimination they
show that ﬁrms face a prisoners’ dilemma situation. Price discrimination is bad for
proﬁts but good for consumers.
As the model presented in chapter is mainly related to the literature on BBPD
next we present the main works on this area of research. As mentioned BBPD is the
practice of charging diﬀerent prices to previous customers of a ﬁrm and to the rivals’
previous customers (or new customers of a ﬁrm). Two approaches have been con-
sidered so far. In the brand preferences approach (e.g. Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg
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and Tirole (2000), Villas-Boas (2004), Esteves (2010)), purchase history discloses in-
formation about a consumer’s exogenous brand preference for a ﬁrm. In the switching
costs approach, consumers initially view the two ﬁrms as perfect substitutes; but in the
second period they face a switching cost if they change supplier. In this setting, pur-
chase history discloses information about exogenous switching costs (e.g. Chen (1997)
and Taylor (2003)). Although the framework of competition diﬀers in both approaches
have some common prediction. Price discrimination leads ﬁrms to oﬀer better deals to
the rival’s consumers than to its previous customers. Second, because both ﬁrms have
symmetric information for price discrimination purposes and each ﬁrm regards its pre-
vious clientele as its strong market and the rival’s clientele as its weak market–in the
terminology of Corts (1998) there is best-response asymmetry–ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves
in the classic prisoner’s dilemma. Third, there is socially excessive switching between
ﬁrms. Nonetheless, important diﬀerences arise in both approaches when taking into ac-
count the eﬀects of poaching on initial prices. While in the brand preferences approach
when BBPD is permitted initial prices are high and then decrease (e.g. Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000)), in the switching costs approach the reverse happens (e.g. Chen (1997)).
In the two previous approaches consumers are perfectly informed and there is no
role for advertising. Esteves (2009a) oﬀers a ﬁrst look at dynamic eﬀects of customer
poaching in homogeneous product markets, where advertising is used by ﬁrms as a
way to transmit relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers. She shows
that price discrimination might boost industry proﬁts at the expense of consumers’
surplus. Regarding the welfare eﬀects, price discrimination is generally bad for welfare
and consumers’ surplus, though good for ﬁrms. The goal of this thesis is to extend
Esteves (2009a) to a product diﬀerentiation market as a way to investigate whether or
not new insights emerge about the economic eﬀects of BBPD.
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Chapter 2
Benchmark Models
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents two benchmark models that will be useful to compare the results
derived in the subsequent chapters where ﬁrms endogenously segment the market into
imperfectly informed consumers in period 1 and are allowed to price discriminate in
period 2. In the ﬁrst benchmark ﬁrms choose advertising decisions and uniform prices
in period 1 and in period 2 price discrimination cannot occur, either because ﬁrms have
no information or because it is not permitted. In this model consumers are imperfectly
informed about the ﬁrms’ existence and prices and ﬁrms compete in uniform prices in
both periods. In the second benchmark, consumers are perfectly informed and ﬁrms
only compete in prices in both periods. However, in period 2 ﬁrms are allowed to price
discriminate.
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2.2 Competition with advertising and no price
discrimination
2.2.1 The model
Consider ﬁrst the case where ﬁrms need to invest in advertising to give information
about the existence and price of their products. As usual in the literature of informative
advertising we are assuming that without advertising consumers are uninformed and
cannot buy the ﬁrms’ products. Regarding price competition we start the analysis
with the case where any form of price discrimination is not permitted, either because
ﬁrms do not observe the ﬁrst period decisions of individual consumers or because
price discriminate is prohibited. This benchmark model will be useful to evaluate the
competitive and welfare eﬀects of price discrimination with advertising. The analysis
here is similar to that of Tirole (1988) model and it is a simpliﬁcation of Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) model.
Consider a market with two ﬁrms denoted by, i = A,B, producing diﬀerentiated
products/brands, which we will refer to as brand A and brand B, respectively. Each
ﬁrm is located at each end of the unit interval: ﬁrm A is located at θ = 0 and ﬁrm
B is located at θ = 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the line segment
[0, 1] distributed with density 1 along this interval and they derive gross surplus v from
consuming the good. Throughout the thesis we will assume that v is suﬃciently large so
that as long as informed consumers will always buy. Consumers incur a transportation
cost t per unit of distance. Hence, a consumer located in address θ incurs transportation
costs tθ if buying from ﬁrm A and t(1− θ) if buying the good of ﬁrm B. Assume also
that each consumer buys at most one unit of either brand A or B, when informed.
There are two periods. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms simultaneously choose brand ad-
vertising levels, φi ∈ [0, 1] as well as its price (denoted by pi),i = A,B. In period
1, ﬁrms have no information about consumer preferences so that they cannot price
discriminate and choose the uniform prices pA and pB.
After ﬁrms have sent their advertisements (henceforth ads) independently, a pro-
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portion φi and φj of customers are reached, respectively by ﬁrm i and j’s advertising.
Therefore, there are three types of consumers. There are consumers who purchase
from the only known ﬁrm that we call captive consumers, namely φi

1− φj

. There
are consumers who receive ads from both ﬁrms and we call them selective consumers,
namely φiφj. There are also consumers who receive no ad from either ﬁrm, remain
uninformed and out of the market. A captive consumer buys from the known ﬁrm as
long as the price does not exceed v; if he receives ads from both ﬁrms he chooses the
lowest full price if it does not exceed v.
Let the superscript nd identify the no-discrimination case. In period 1 ﬁrms A and
B choose advertising intensities simultaneously and non-cooperatively and announce
their prices under non-discrimination pndA and p
nd
B .
Consider for instance the case of ﬁrm i. Its potential demand has size Di. It can be
decomposed in two parts. A fraction φi

1− φj

does not receive an ad from ﬁrm j. It
can thus be considered ﬁrm i’s turf of captive consumers. A fraction φiφj also receives
at least an ad of ﬁrm j, and therefore constitutes a more elastic or competitive fragment
of the demand. The consumers that receive no ad from either ﬁrm are uniformed and
excluded from the market.
Firm A faces a demand of
DA = φAφB Pr

pndA + tθ < p
nd
B + t(1− θ)

+ φA (1− φB)
which simpliﬁes to
DA = φAφB

pndB − pndA + t
2t

+ φA (1− φB) . (2.1)
Similarly, ﬁrm B’s demand is given by
DB = φAφB Pr

pndA + tθ > p
nd
B + t(1− θ)

+ φB (1− φA) ,
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which simpliﬁes to
DB = φAφB

pndA − pndB + t
2t

+ φB (1− φA) . (2.2)
Since in the second period customers are all anonymous to the ﬁrms and the prices
announced through advertising in period 1 remain constant in period 2, each ﬁrm’s
demand is equal in both periods.
2.2.2 Advertising technology
Advertising is a costly activity for ﬁrms and conveys information on product existence
and price. Let φi, (i = A,B) denote the fraction of consumers who receive an ad from
ﬁrm i. The cost of reaching fraction φi of consumers is denoted A (φi). As usual in the
literature (e.g. Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Tirole (1988)) we assume
that the cost of reaching consumers increases at an increasing rate, which formally can
be written ∂A
∂φ
= Aφ > 0 and
∂2A
∂φ2
= Aφφ > 0. The latter condition means that it
is increasingly more expensive to inform an additional customer or likewise, to reach
a higher proportion of costumers. It is also assumed that there are no ﬁxed costs in
advertising, that is, A (0) = 0. Following Tirole (1988), to simplify the computations, I
will consider a quadratic advertising cost function given by Aφ =
a
2
φ2 with a maximum
advertising expenditure a
2
. Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) propose
other technologies with the same mathematical properties but more complicated to
manipulate.
2.2.3 Equilibrium analysis
As ﬁrst period price decisions are valid for the two periods assuming that each ﬁrm
discounts future proﬁts using a common discount factor, δ ∈ (0, 1), ﬁrm i proﬁt is equal
to:
πi = (1 + δ)

piφi

1− φj

+ piφiφj

pj − pi + t
2t

− A (φi)
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In period 1 ﬁrms simultaneously chooses prices and advertising levels. Each ﬁrm goal
is to solve the following maximization problem:
max
pi,φi

(1 + δ)

piφi

1− φj

+ piφiφj

pj − pi + t
2t

− A (φi)

Using the quadratic advertising costs A (φi) =
aφ2
i
2
, and solving ﬁrst the model with
respect to pi it follows that from the ﬁrst order condition with respect to pi we obtain
ﬁrm i best response function given pj:
pi =
1
2φj

2t− tφj + φjpj

(2.3)
As we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium it must be true that pi = pj = p
nd thus
pnd =
1
2φj

2t− tφj + φjp

pnd = t

2− φj

φj
It is now straightforward to ﬁnd the equilibrium level of advertising. From
max
φi
	
(1 + δ)

2− φj

t


φi

1− φj

φj
+
φi
2

− A (φi)

we obtain the FOC with respect to φi :
φi =
1
a
pi

1− φj + φj

pj − pi + t
2t

(2.4)
Note that from the proﬁt maximization with respect to φi we obtain that in the
best response function of ﬁrm i with respect to φj:
(1 + δ) t

2− φj
2
2φj  
MRAnd
= Aφ
MACnd
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The previous equation shows that in equilibrium the marginal revenue of sending an
additional ad must be equal to the cost of sending that additional ad. With the
quadratic advertising cost function the previous equation can be written as follows:
(1 + δ)

2− φj
2
t
2φj
= aφi
As the model is symmetric we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium where pnd1 =
pnd2 = p
nd and φnd1 = φ
nd
2 = φ
nd. Solving the corresponding set of ﬁrst-order conditions,
we obtain the symmetric subgame perfect price-advertising nash equilibrium. So we
can write the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the benchmark case without price discrimination, as long as
a ≥ (1+δ)t
2
, there is a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) Firms choose an advertising reach, denoted φnd ∈ (0, 1) , equal to φnd = 2
1+

2a
t(1+δ)
.
(ii) Equilibrium prices in both periods are pnd =

2at
(δ+1)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the appendix we show 0 < φnd ≤ 1 as long as a ≥ (1+δ)t
2
. Before proceeding note
also that as expected when δ = 0 the equilibrium solution is equal to the static game
presented in Tirole (1988).
Note that ∂pnd/∂φnd < 0 whereas ∂φnd/∂pnd > 0. Hence, greater levels of ad-
vertising stimulate price competition (i.e. lower prices) and higher prices stimulate
advertising competition (i.e. higher levels of advertising). It is also easy to observe
that price and advertising levels are increasing in product diﬀerentiation (t), while more
costly advertising (a) induces less advertising and higher prices.
Given the equilibrium level of advertising φnd, it is straightforward to obtain each
ﬁrm overall proﬁt with no discrimination as a function of φnd:
Πndi =
(1 + δ) (2− φnd)2t− a φnd2
2
.
From Proposition 1 we get the following corollary.
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Corollary 1 For any δ ∈ ]0, 1] , assuming that a ≥ (1+δ)t
2
, each ﬁrm overall equilib-
rium proﬁt equal to
Πnd =
2a

(δ + 1)
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2 . (2.5)
As expected, proﬁt increases in the degree of product diﬀerentiation, reﬂecting
higher prices and a greater level of demand due to additional advertising. Somewhat
unexpectedly, however, proﬁt also increases with advertising costs. As ﬁrms engage in
less advertising, the corresponding decrease in price competition overcompensates the
direct tendency towards higher advertising costs. This is precisely the result found by
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and in Tirole (1988).
2.2.4 Welfare analysis
Social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and industry proﬁts, or equivalently
the net utility for all consumers who buy the product in both periods minus overall
advertising costs. Overall welfare is given by W = w1 + δw2.
First-period welfare is equal to:
w1,nd =

φnd
2
v − 2
 1/2
0
tθdθ

+ φnd

1− φndv − 2 1
0
tθdθ

− 2A φnd
=

φnd
2
v − 2t

θ2
2
1/2
0

+ φnd

1− φndv − 4t θ2
2
1
0

− 2A φnd
=

φnd
2
v − t
4

+ φnd

1− φnd (v − t)− 2A φnd
= φnd

v +
1
4
t

3φnd − 4− 2A φnd
while
w2,nd =

φnd
2
v − 2
 1/2
0
tθdθ

+ φnd

1− φndv − 2 1
0
tθdθ

= φnd

v +
t
4

3φnd − 4
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Therefore, it is straightforward to obtain that overall welfare with no discrimination
is equal to:
W nd = (1 + δ)φnd

v +
t
4

3φnd − 4− 2A φnd
= (1 + δ)φnd

v +
t
4

3φnd − 4− a φnd2
Using our previous computations industry proﬁt with no discrimination can be written
as a function of φnd. Thus, using the fact that Πndind = 2Π
nd, then
Πndind = (1 + δ) t(2− φnd)2 − a

φnd
2
We can now compute expected consumer surplus given by W nd − Πndind :
ECSnd = (1 + δ)φnd

v +
t
4

3φnd − 4− a φnd2
− (1 + δ) t(2− φnd)2 + a φnd2
= (1 + δ)φnd

v +
t
4

3φnd − 4− (1 + δ) t(2− φnd)2
= (1 + δ)

φnd

v +
t
4

3φnd − 4− t(2− φnd)2
For the case where δ = 1 it follows that with no-discrimination:
Πndind = 2t(2− φnd)2 − a

φnd
2
Wnd = 2φnd

v +
t

3φnd − 4
4

− a φnd2
ECSnd = φnd

2v +
t

3φnd − 4
2

− 2t(2− φnd)2
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2.3 Competition with perfect informed consumers
and price discrimination
2.3.1 The model
Consider next the benchmark case where consumers are perfectly informed about the
ﬁrms’ product existence and prices. Here we will assume that after consumers have
made their buying decisions in period 1 ﬁrms can recognise their previous customers
and those that bought from the rival and set prices accordingly. In other words, ﬁrms
can price discriminate between old and new customers. The analysis here is similar to
that of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). Thus, suppose two ﬁrms, A and B, produce at
zero marginal cost nondurable goods A and B. There are two periods, 1 and 2. On
the demand side, there is population of consumers with mass normalized to 1, each of
whom wishes to buy a single unit of either good A or B in each of the two periods.
Consumer preferences are as speciﬁed in the Hotelling-style linear market of unit length
with ﬁrms positioned at the endpoints. A consumer brand preference parameter θ is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and remains ﬁxed for both periods of consumption. As
usual a consumer located at θ incurs total cost pA + tθ if he buys from ﬁrm A at price
pA, and he incurs total cost pB + t(1− θ) if he buys the unit from B at price pB.
Assume also suppose ﬁrms cannot commit to future prices. As in FT model con-
sumers reveal information about their brand preference by their ﬁrst-period choice.
Suppose that standard competition à la Hotelling allows ﬁrm A to attract a fraction of
θ1. Thus, ﬁrm A’s turf is the interval [0, θ1], while ﬁrm B’s turf is the remaining [θ1, 1].
In period 2 each ﬁrm is able to recognise its own previous customers and the rival’s
ones, and thus they can charge diﬀerent prices to their own ﬁrst-period customers pOi ,
and to the rival’s previous customers pRi .
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2.3.2 Equilibrium analysis
Second-period
In the second-period both ﬁrms can recognise a customer who belongs to its turf and
to the rival’s turf. Thus, both ﬁrms can charge diﬀerent prices to their own ﬁrst-period
customers pOi , and to the rival’s previous customers p
R
i .
Proposition 2. When ﬁrms can price discriminate between old/new customers
second period equilibrium prices are:
pOA =
1
3
t (2θ1 + 1) ; p
R
A =
1
3
t (3− 4θ1)
pOB =
1
3
t (3− 2θ1) ; pRB =
1
3
t (4θ1 − 1) .
It is straightforward to obtain that at the interior solution, i.e., if 1
4
≤ θ1 ≤ 34 both
ﬁrms make the same proﬁt in the second period, given by
π2i =
5
9
t

2θ21 − 2θ1 + 1

.
It is interesting to note that in this case each ﬁrm’s second-period proﬁt is minimized
when ﬁrms share the ﬁrst period market equally. The reason is that an equal initial
market share generates the most informative outcome in the second period, and, in
this setting with best response asymmetry, more information destroys proﬁt. When
initial market shares are very asymmetric, on the other hand, little is learned about
most consumers’ brand preferences, competition is less intense and proﬁts increase.
Proof. The proof of this proposition can be found in Esteves and Rey (2010).
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First-period
Turn now to ﬁrst-period competition. Let p1i represent ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst-period price, i =
A,B. At an interior solution the indiﬀerent consumer is located at θ1 such that:
p1A + tθ1 + δ

pRB + t (1− θ1)

= p1B + t (1− θ1) + δ

pRA + tθ1

It is straightforward to obtain that
θ1

p1A, p
1
B

=
1
2
+
3 (p1B − p1A)
2t (δ + 3)
.
Each ﬁrm overall objective function is
ΠA = p
1
Aθ1

p1A, p
1
B

+ δπ2A

θ1

p1A, p
1
B

,
ΠB = p
1
B

1− θ1

p1A, p
1
B

+ δπ2B

θ1

p1A, p
1
B

.
Proposition 3 There is a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) First-period equilibrium prices are p1A = p
1
B = t

1 + δ
3

and the ﬁrst-period
market is split symmetrically with θ1 (p1A, p
1
B) =
1
2
.
(ii) Second-period equilibrium prices are pOA = p
O
B =
2
3
t and pRA = p
R
B =
1
3
t.
Proof. The proof of this proposition can be found in Esteves and Rey (2010).
2.3.3 Welfare analysis
As usual total welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and industry proﬁts.
When consumers are fully informed and ﬁrms can price discriminate between old/new
customers second period welfare w2 is given by
w2 = v −
 1
3
θ1+
1
6
0
tθdθ −
 θ1
1
3
θ1+
1
6
t(1− θ)dθ −
 5
6
−1
3
θ1
θ1
tθdθ −
 1
5
6
− 1
3
θ1
t(1− θ)dθ
= v − 11
36
t
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In period 1 consumers buy from the closer ﬁrm, thus ﬁrst-period welfare is equal to
w1 = v − 2
 1
2
0
tθdθ = v − t
4
Thus, under BBPD and perfect informed consumers overall welfare is given by W =
w1 + δw2, or
W = v (1 + δ)− 1
4
t− 11δ
36
t (2.6)
In equilibrium industry proﬁt under BBPD with perfect informed consumers is
Πind =
1
9
t (8δ + 9) (2.7)
It is now straightforward to obtain consumer surplus, denoted ECS = W − Πind.
At the interior solution equilibrium solution we have:
ECS = v − 5
4
t− 43
36
tδ + vδ (2.8)
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Chapter 3
Competition with Advertising and
Price Discrimination
3.1 Introduction
Advertising plays an important informative role mainly in new product markets by con-
veying information to otherwise uninformed consumers. When ﬁrms and consumers
interact more than once, by collecting information about the “reach” of their advert-
ising ﬁrms may learn the identity/address of consumers that receive one of their ads.
If ﬁrms realise that some of these informed consumers do not buy from the ﬁrm cur-
rently but rather from the rival, they can try to induce them to switch by oﬀering them
selective price discounts. Thus, advertising is a tool for price discrimination practices.
This chapter oﬀers the main contribution of this thesis by proposing an original
model of targeted advertising with behaviour-based price discrimination. As said in
the literature review, with the exception of Esteves (2009a) the literature on BBPD
as been developed assuming that consumers are perfectly informed and there is no
role for informative advertising. As Esteves (2009a) we depart from this assumption
by assuming that ﬁrms need to invest in advertising to inform consumers about the
existence and price of their very new products.
We consider a two period duopoly model with anonymous consumers who may
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buy from a ﬁrm only if they receive an ad from it. In the ﬁrst-period ﬁrms need to
invest in advertising to become known and also give information about prices. As
prices can change faster than consumers’ awareness, in the second period, the level
of awareness is constant and ﬁrms can only change prices. As in Esteves (2009a)
advertising plays two diﬀerent tasks. First, as all consumers are initially uninformed,
advertising decisions endogenously create consumer heterogeneity in awareness of the
ﬁrms’ existence and prices. Second, by collecting information about the “reach” of their
advertising, ﬁrms learn the identity of informed consumers who bought from them in
period 1 and send later advertising messages with diﬀerent prices to their own and to
the rival’s previous customers. The possibility of ﬁrms to reconnect and communicate
with “lost” customers and entice them back is nowadays possible and has been known
as retargeting1. As is explained in Esteves 2009, “once a potential customer is aware
of a ﬁrm’s website (e.g. through normal advertising channels) and visits it, a cookie is
passed to the consumer’s browser that records his behavior on the site and identiﬁes
him as either a nonpurchaser or a customer that bought from the ﬁrm. Then, at a
determined time, loyal customers and potential consumers are retargeted with messages
speciﬁc to them.2”
The main contribution of this thesis is to extend Esteves (2009a) to a product
diﬀerentiation model. While Esteves (2009a) deals with a homogeneous product market
we propose a model with horizontal product diﬀerentiation. Our aim is to investigate
how the ability to price discriminate aﬀects: (i) the ﬁrms’ pricing and advertising
strategies and (ii) the level of proﬁts and social welfare.
This chapter is organized as follows. Next we present the model. Section 3.2,
analyses the second stage of the game where ﬁrms compete with price discrimination.
1This marketing practice is also referred to as behavioral retargeting, remarketing or remessaging.
2Boomerang, DoubleClick’s one-to-one targeting group, gives the following retargeting example.
“A consumer goes to an online shoe retailer and leaves the site without making a purchase. Then by
utilizing a retargeting technology, the shoe retailer can catch the consumer the next time (when he’s
visiting a news site, perhaps). By visiting a site, a consumer has let that site know he is interested in
the product and Retargeting helps the advertiser entice the consumer to return and buy its product
(e.g. receive 10 percent oﬀ if you buy today).” See http://www.websmartamerica.com/behavioral-
retargeting.php.
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Section 3.3 presents the ﬁrst stage of the model in which advertising decisions are taken
in a non-cooperative way. Section 3.4 and 3.5 discusses, respectively, the competitive
eﬀects of price discrimination and advertising. Section 3.6 analyses the welfare eﬀects
of price discrimination through advertising.
3.2 The model
The model presented in this chapter is similar to the model presented in section 2.2
except that now in period 2 we allow ﬁrms to use the information about consumer’s
past behaviour to employ BBPD. Therefore, suppose two ﬁrms, A and B, are launching
a new diﬀerentiated good. In period 1 ﬁrms need to invest in advertising to provide
information about their product existence and prices. In this period ﬁrms choose
simultaneously an advertising intensity and price. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms cannot
price-discriminate because they have no information about consumers’ type. In period
2, after having observed the consumers’ previous decisions ﬁrms are able to distinguish
their previous consumers from those that bought from the rival before and set prices
accordingly.
As in section 2.2 ﬁrms need to invest in advertising to generate demand. This means
that at the begining of the game consumers are uniformed about the product existence.
After advertising decisions have been made there are four segments of consumers: ﬁrm
A’s captive (monopoly) segment (φA (1− φB)), ﬁrm B’s captive segment (φB (1− φA)),
the selective segment (φAφB) and non-informed consumers ((1− φA) (1− φB)) . The
group of captive consumers purchase from the only known ﬁrm as long as the price
oﬀered is below or equal to v. A selective consumer receives ads from both ﬁrms there-
fore he chooses the lowest full price if it does not exceed v. Consumers are uniformly
distributed on the unit interval [0, 1]. Firm A (product A) is located at point θ = 0,
while ﬁrm B (product B) is located at point θ = 1. Hence for a consumer located at
θ ∈ [0, 1], tθ is the transport cost of choosing product A and t (1− θ) is the transport
cost of choosing product B.
Look next on each ﬁrm’s demand. Consider for instance the case of ﬁrm A. A
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captive consumer to ﬁrm A buys product A as long as pA + tθ ≤ v.3 A selective
consumer who is indiﬀerent between the two ﬁrms is located at θ, thus
p1A + tθ = p
1
B + t(1− θ).
Hence, a consumer located at θ is indiﬀerent between buying product A or B if
θ =
p1B − p1A + t
2t
.
We can now compute ﬁrm A and B demand, respectively given by:
DA = φAφB

p1B − p1A + t
2t

+ φA (1− φB) . (3.1)
and
DB = φAφB

p1A − p1B + t
2t

+ φB (1− φA) . (3.2)
In period 2 ﬁrms are constrained to reach the same consumers. However, in this
period by observing the consumers’ purchase history each ﬁrm will be able to recognise
its previous customers and those that receive one its ads in period 1 but decided to
buy the product from the rival. In this period, each ﬁrm will choose a diﬀerent price
to its own customers (pOi ) and to the rival’s customers (p
R
i ). Note however that ﬁrms
can only try to poach a selective consumer who bought from the rival before.
3.2.1 Advertising technology
Advertising is a costly activity for ﬁrms and conveys information on product existence
and price. Let φi, (i = A,B) denote the fraction of consumers who receive an ad from
ﬁrm i. The cost of reaching fraction φi of consumers is denoted A (φi). As usual in the
literature (e.g. Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Tirole (1988)) we assume
3In the subsequent analyisis we will assume that the condition pA + t ≤ v is always satisﬁed
to guarantee that nobody stays out of the market. This is a standard assumption in the Hotelling
framework.
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that the cost of reaching consumers increases at an increasing rate, which formally can
be written ∂A
∂φ
= Aφ > 0 and
∂2A
∂φ2
= Aφφ > 0. The latter condition means that it
is increasingly more expensive to inform an additional customer or likewise, to reach
a higher proportion of costumers. It is also assumed that there are no ﬁxed costs in
advertising, that is, A (0) = 0. Following Tirole (1988), to simplify the computations, I
will consider a quadratic advertising cost function given by Aφ =
a
2
φ2 with a maximum
advertising expenditure a
2
. Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) propose
other technologies with the same mathematical properties but more complicated to
manipulate.
3.3 Equilibrium analysis
3.3.1 Second-period
After period 1, when customers can be recognized, ﬁrms may price discriminate between
their old and new costumers. When a ﬁrm achieves that type of knowledge, it may
have incentives to send targeted ads with better deals to the selective consumers, in an
eﬀort to poach them from the rival ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm has the ability identify the selective
consumers who bought from the rival ﬁrm in period 1 but they cannot distinguish
from their own consumers who are captive or selective consumers. This means that in
period 2, ﬁrms can only recognize the old and new costumers. In other words, there
are two segments each of size φA (1− φB) and φB (1− φA) which consists of consumers
who are in one ﬁrm’s database but not in the other, that is, each ﬁrm group of captive
consumers. There is no competition for these consumers in period 2.
In second period, when price discrimination is allowed, ﬁrms select a pair of second-
prices,

pOi , p
R
i

, where pRi is the price oﬀered by ﬁrm i to the customers that bought
from ﬁrm j in period 1, and pOi is ﬁrm i’s price for customers who purchase from ﬁrm
i in the ﬁrst stage. Note that ﬁrm i′ captive consumers buy from i in period 1 iﬀ
pi1 + tθ < v, where p
i
1 is ﬁrm i
′s ﬁrst period price.
Given the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst period prices there is a cutoﬀ θ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. The consumer located
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at θ∗ is indiﬀerent between buying good A and B. The marginal consumer,
ˆ
θ
A
2 , who
bought from A in the ﬁrst period will be indiﬀerent between buying again from A at
price pOA and switching to ﬁrm B paying p
R
B iﬀ
pOA + t
ˆ
θ
A
2 = p
R
B + t

1−
ˆ
θ
A
2

.
It follows that,
ˆ
θ
A
2 =
pRB − pOA + t
2t
.
Similarly, the marginal consumer,
ˆ
θ
B
2 , who bought from ﬁrm B in the ﬁrst period
will be indiﬀerent between continuing to so at price pOB and switching to ﬁrm A paying
the price pRA iﬀ
pRA + t
ˆ
θ
B
2 = p
O
B + t

1−
ˆ
θ
B
2

,
from which we obtain
ˆ
θ
B
2 =
pOB − pRA + t
2t
.
Look ﬁrst at ﬁrm A’s second period proﬁts. Its second period proﬁt comes from
the customers that buy from ﬁrm A again and from consumers that switched from B
to A in second period. Therefore, total second-period proﬁt for ﬁrm A equals:
π2A = π
O
A + π
R
A.
Firm A’s second period proﬁt from old consumers is equal to
πOA = p
O
AφA (1− φB) + pOAφAφB

pRB − pOA + t
2t

while its proﬁt from the poached selective group is
πRA = p
R
AφAφB

ˆ
θ
B
2 − θ∗

= pRAφAφB

pOB − pRA + t
2t
− θ∗

.
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We can now compute ﬁrm A second period proﬁt which is equal to
π2A = p
O
AφA (1− φB) + pOAφAφB

pRB − pOA + t
2t

+pRAφAφB

pOB − pRA + t
2t
− θ∗

Firm A’s goal is to choose pOA and p
R
A as a way to maximise π
2
A.
4 From the maximisation
problem, and from the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to pOA it follows that
∂πO
A
∂pO
A
= 0
from which we obtain ﬁrm A best response function given pRB :
pOA =
t (2− φB) + φBpRB
2φB
Likewise, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to pRA is given by
∂πR
A
∂pR
A
= 0, thus ﬁrm
A best response function given pOB :
pRA =
pOB + t (1− 2θ∗)
2
.
Analogous expressions hold for ﬁrm B. Therefore, ﬁrm B’s second period proﬁt is
π2B = π
O
B + π
R
B
where
πOB = p
O
BφB (1− φA) + pOBφAφB

pRA − pOB + t
2t

and
πRB = p
R
BφAφB

θ∗ − p
R
B − pOA + t
2t

4Given the strict concavity of the proﬁt function we don’t need to care about second order
conditions.
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We can now compute ﬁrm B second period proﬁt which is equal to
π2B = p
O
BφB (1− φA) + pOBφAφB

pRA − pOB + t
2t

+pRBφAφB

θ∗ − p
R
B − pOA + t
2t

.
From the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to pOB i.e,
∂πO
B
∂pO
B
= 0, we obtain ﬁrm B’s
best response function given pRA :
pOB =
t (2− φA) + φApRA
2φA
and from the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to pRB,
∂πR
B
∂pR
B
= 0, we have that ﬁrm B’s
best response function given pOA is
pRB =
pOA + t (2θ
∗ − 1)
2
.
From the four best response functions it is straightforward to obtain the following
second period equilibrium prices:
pOA =
t [4 + φB (2θ
∗ − 3)]
3φB
pOB =
t [4 + φA (−2θ∗ − 1)]
3φA
pRA =
t [2 + φA (1− 4θ∗)]
3φA
pRB =
t [2 + φB (4θ
∗ − 3)]
3φB
As expected when consumers are fully informed about ﬁrms’ existence, that is when
φ = 1 we obtain the Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) second-period equilibrium prices
given the uniform distribution of consumers preferences. Speciﬁcally, when θ∗ = 1
2
,
pOA = p
O
B =
2
3
t and pRA = p
R
B =
1
3
t.
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We can now specify both ﬁrms’ second period proﬁt function as
π2A =
t
18φAφB

φ2A (2φBθ
∗ − 3φB + 4)2 + φ2B (φA − 4φAθ∗ + 2)2

,
and
π2B =
t
18φAφB

φ2B (φA + 2φAθ
∗ − 4)2 + φ2A (4φBθ∗ − 3φB + 2)2

.
3.3.2 First-period
With the above results in hand, we can now analyze the initial period where ﬁrms
make their advertising and pricing decisions rationally anticipating how such decisions
will aﬀect their proﬁts in the subsequent period.
Assuming a common discount factor, δ ∈ ]0, 1], the present value of ﬁrm A’s overall
proﬁt can be written as follows:
ΠA = π
1
A + δπ
2
A
where
π1A = p
1
AφA

(1− φB) + φB

p1B − p1A + t
2t

− A (φA) (3.3)
and
π2A =
t
18φAφB

φ2A (2φBθ
∗ − 3φB + 4)2 + φ2B (φA − 4φAθ∗ + 2)2

(3.4)
Given the cutoﬀ θ∗ ∈ [0, 1] , it follows that type θ∗ is indiﬀerent between buying
good A in period 1 at p1A and then switch to B in period 2 and pay p
R
B, or buying B
in period 1 at price p1B and then switch to A and pay p
R
A. In other words, type θ
∗ is
deﬁned by
v − p1A − tθ∗ + δ

v − pRB − t (1− θ∗)

= v − p1B − t (1− θ∗) + δ

v − pRA − tθ∗

. (3.5)
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Solving the previous equation in order to θ∗ yields
θ∗ =
tδ (2φB − 2φA + φAφB) + 3φAφB (t− p1A + p1B)
2tφAφB (δ + 3)
. (3.6)
Firm A and B objective is to choose the price and advertising intensity as a way to
maximise overall proﬁt. Look ﬁrst on ﬁrm A decisions. From ∂ΠA
∂p1
A
= 0 it follows that:
dπ1
A
dp1
A
+
dπ2
A
dp1
A
= 0. However, we have that
dπ2
A
dp1
A
=
dπ2
A
dθ∗
dθ∗
dp1
A
. Thus, the derivative of overall
proﬁt with respect to p1A is
dπ1A
dp1A
+
dπ2A
dθ∗
dθ∗
dp1A
= 0.
This yields:
p1A =
10tφA (δ + 1) + 2tφB

δ + δ2 + 4
− tφAφB (δ + 3)2 + φAφBp1B (3δ − 1)
2φAφB (4 + 3δ)
.
Similar derivation of ΠB of with respect to p
1
B gives:
p1B =
10tφB (δ + 1) + 2tφA

δ + δ2 + 4
− tφAφB (δ + 3)2 + φAφBp1A (3δ − 1)
2φAφB (4 + 3δ)
.
Therefore, ﬁrm i best response function given ﬁrm j’s price is:
pi =
10tφi (δ + 1) + 2tφj

δ + δ2 + 4
− tφiφj (δ + 3)2 + φiφjpj (3δ − 1)
2φiφj (4 + 3δ)
. (3.7)
Now consider the equilibrium choice of advertising intensity. Plugging θ∗ into the over-
all expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i, it is straightforward to ﬁnd that the ﬁrst-order condition
respect to φi. This gives ﬁrm i’s best-response function with respect to φj :
aφi = −
pi
2t (δ + 3)

t

3φj + δφj − 6

+ 3φj (pi − pj)

+
2δ
3φ2i (δ + 3)
2

2t

φi − φj

(δ − 2) + 5φiφj (pi − pj)

This equation states the equality between the marginal cost of advertising aφi and
32
the marginal beneﬁt of informing an additional consumer.
As the game is symmetric we are looking for a symmetric subgame perfect nash
equilibrium such that p1A = p
1
B = p
∗ and φA = φB = φ
∗.
Proposition 4 There is a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) In period 1 the equilibrium level of advertising φ∗is equal to φ∗ = t(δ+6)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(δ+3)−6a
and satisﬁes the condition 0 < φ∗ ≤ 1 as long as a ∈ R\

t(δ+3)
6

. The equilibrium
price is equal to p∗ = t(1+ δ
3
)

2−φ∗
φ∗

, and both ﬁrms share equally the market in period
1, that is θ∗ (p1A, p
1
B) =
1
2
.
(ii) In period 2, equilibrium prices are pO = 2t
3

2−φ∗
φ∗

and pR = t
3

2−φ∗
φ∗

.
As usual in the literature of BBPD ﬁrms oﬀer lower prices to the rival’s previous
customers than to old customers. It is interesting to note that ﬁrms oﬀering lower
second period prices to relatively price-sensitive segments than ﬁrst period price. Loyal
customer pay two times more than new customers. A key of this model is that a
consumer’s purchase of a rival’s product in the ﬁrst period implies a weaker demand
of the consumer towards the ﬁrm’s product in the second period. This motivates each
ﬁrm to oﬀer lower prices to its rival’s customers in the second period because each ﬁrm
wants to attract the competitor’s previous customers.
Given the equilibrium level of advertising φ∗, each ﬁrm second-period equilibrium
proﬁt is equal to
π∗2 =
5
18
t (2− φ∗)2
while each ﬁrm’ s ﬁrst period equilibrium proﬁt equals
π∗1 =
t
2
(φ∗ − 2)2

1
3
δ + 1

− A (φ∗)
Corollary 2 For any δ ∈ ]0, 1] , overall equilibrium proﬁt under BBPD with ad-
vertising is equal to
Π∗ =
t
18
(φ∗ − 2)2 (8δ + 9)− A(φ∗),
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while overall equilibrium proﬁt without BBPD is given by
Πnd =
t
2

2− φnd2 (1 + δ)−A φnd .
3.4 Competitive eﬀects of price discrimination
With the above results in hand, we are now in a position to investigate how price
discrimination aﬀects the equilibrium outcomes - i.e., prices, advertising and proﬁts.
To implement this exercise we will compare the equilibrium outcomes with BBPD and
advertising with those presented in the non-discrimination case (section 2.2).
Advertising
Regarding advertising decisions if we compare the ﬁrms’s advertising choices with
and without advertising we observe that ﬁrms choose more advertising under no-
discrimination than under discrimination. Remember that the equilibrium level of
advertising with BBPD and advertising must satisfy the condition a ∈ R\

t(δ+3)
6

.
The equilibrium level of advertising with no discrimination and advertising must satisfy
the condition a ≥ t. From the comparison of φ∗ and φnd we can establish the following
result.
Proposition 5 From the comparison between φ∗ and φnd it is true that φnd > φ∗,
thus ﬁrms advertise more with no discrimination than with BBPD.
Proof. See Appendix
Consider next the eﬀect of price discrimination on ﬁrms’ advertising decisions. To
plot the functions we will assume that δ = 1 and t = 1. From a ∈ R\2t
3

and a ≥ t,
we will only consider that a ≥ t, thus a ≥ 1. The ﬁgure illustrates the downward
sloping curves which represent the marginal revenue of advertising with discrimination
(MRA_D). The upward sloping curves are the marginal advertising cost using the
quadratic advertising cost function.The optimal level of advertising is given by the
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intersection between a MRA curve and the corresponding MCA. Thus, the intersection
between an MRA D and MCA provides the equilibrium level of advertising with price
discrimination. Similarly, the intersection between an MRA ND and MCA provides the
equilibrium level of advertising with no price discrimination. From the above picture
it is evident that as long as a ≥ t it always the case that φnd > φ∗. Note that when
t = 1 and a = 1, φnd = 1. For other values such that a > 1, φ∗ < φnd < 1.
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Prices
Look ﬁrst at the impact of BBPD on second period prices.
Second-period prices Here we compare second period prices of the dynamic price
discrimination game with second period prices under advertising and uniform pricing.
We can therefore establish the following result.
Proposition 6 When we move from the no-discrimination and advertising case to
the BBPD with advertising case, second period prices fall down, thus pR < pO < pnd.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Next ﬁgure plots the equilibrium price to old and new customers (p2_Old and
p2_Rival) when ﬁrms are able to price discriminate and the second-period equilib-
rium price under non-discrimination (p2_nd). As ﬁrms advertise more under no-
discrimination, the ﬁgure shows that consumers pay always lower prices when ﬁrms
are allowed to price discriminate. In other words, we see that second-period prices are
below the non-discrimination counterparts. A ban on price discrimination would make
consumers pay higher second-period equilibrium prices.
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First period prices Now we compare ﬁrst period equilibrium prices with BBPD
and advertising with the ﬁrst period equilibrium price derived in the benchmark case
with advertising and no-discrimination (section 2.2). We can establish the following
result.
Proposition 7 When we move from the no-discrimination and advertising case to
BBPD with advertising case, ﬁrst-period prices increase, that is p1 > pnd.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Next we plot the behaviour of ﬁrst period prices with and with no discrimination
as a function of φ. As ﬁrms advertise more under no-discrimination from a comparison
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between p1 and p
nd
1 , we observe that p1 > p
nd
1 for any φ ∈ ]0, 1[. Thus, ﬁrst-period
equilibrium prices are lower under uniform pricing than under discriminating. As in
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) price discrimination raises ﬁrst period prices but reduces
second-period prices. The reason is that as consumers foresee lower second-period
prices due to discrimination they become less price sensitive. Consequently, ﬁrm raise
the ﬁrst-period price.
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Proﬁts
Next we compare equilibrium proﬁts with and without price discrimination both in
period 2 and 1.
Proposition 8 When we move from the no-discrimination and advertising case to
BBPD with advertising, second period equilibrium proﬁt decreases while ﬁrst-period
equilibrium proﬁt increases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Proposition 9 Firms are better oﬀ under price discrimination than under non-
discrimination because overall proﬁts increase when we move from non-discrimination
to discrimination.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This is a very relevant result of this model because it shows that in contrast to the
extant literature n BBPD, price discrimination in the context of imperfect informed
consumers do not lead to the usual prisoner’s dilemma situation. A standard result in
the literature on BBPD with perfect informed consumers is that overall proﬁts decrease
when ﬁrms can price discriminate. Here as in Esteves (2009a) price discrimination can
beneﬁt ﬁrms. However, the intuition for our result is diﬀerent from that in Esteves
(2009a). In Esteves (2009a) only one of the ﬁrms (the high-price ﬁrm in period 1)
has information to discriminate in period 2. This gives rise to the race for discrimin-
ation eﬀect according to both ﬁrms have incentives to price above non-discrimination
levels in period 1. In contrast to Esteves (2009a) in the present model both ﬁrms
can price discriminate in period 2. Overall proﬁts with discrimination are above the
non-discrimination levels because (i) consumers become less price sensitive in period 1
and so ﬁrst period prices increase and (ii) because ﬁrms choose less advertising with
discrimination which softens price competition in both periods.
The next table summarizes all the results obtained in this section.
Table 1: Main Results
Variable Comparison
Advertising levels φ∗ < φnd, a > t
First-period prices p1 > pnd
Second-period prices to old customers pO < pnd
Second-period prices to rival customers pR < pnd
First-period proﬁts π∗1 > π
nd
1
Second-period proﬁts π∗2 < π
nd
2
Overall proﬁts Π∗ > Πnd
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3.5 Competitive eﬀects of imperfect information
Basically the aim of this section is to investigate how ﬁrst and second period prices
behave as we move from BBPD with perfect to BBPD with imperfect information. To
do so, we compare the equilibrium price solutions of BBPD with perfect information
(φ = 1) with the equilibrium solutions with BBPD under imperfect information. Re-
member that the case of BBPD with perfect information is the case of Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000) which was presented in section 2.3.
The impact of information on prices is obtained by comparing the equilibrium prices
under full and imperfect information.
Second-period prices We have seen that when information is perfect (φ = 1) pOA =
pOB =
2
3
t and pRA = p
R
B =
1
3
t. In contrast under imperfect information we have found
that pOA = p
O
B =
2t
3

2−φ
φ

and pRA = p
R
B =
t
3

2−φ
φ

. It is easy to see the perfect
information prices are below the imperfect information counterparts as long as φ < 1.
Thus, the discriminatory prices under imperfect information are above those under
perfect information. Note that as ﬁrms advertise more, consumers become better
informed and the group of selective consumers increase. As a result of that price
competition increases and prices decrease.
First-period prices Regarding the eﬀect of imperfect information on ﬁrst-period
prices remember that under perfect information p1 = t(1 + δ
3
) while with imperfect
information it is equal to p1∗ = t(1 + δ
3
)

2−φ
φ

. Again it is straightforward to see that
the ﬁrst period price with perfect information is below ﬁrst-period equilibrium price
under imperfect information as long as φ < 1.
3.6 Welfare analysis
This section investigates the eﬀects of BBPD with targeted advertising on proﬁts,
consumer surplus and on total welfare. When price discrimination is permitted, any
consumer who observes a message from at least one ﬁrm participate in the market. To
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model the eﬀects of price discrimination, it is enough to consider two groups of buyers:
captive consumers and selective consumers, that is those that in fact buy the good. We
construct a welfare function taken into account the consumer surplus for all consumers
consuming the good less the ﬁrms’ advertising costs. The gross beneﬁts to consumers
are a function of the surplus created by each consumer consuming her ideal product
less the average transportation cost incurred by a consumer in the market. To simplify
the analysis, throughout this section, it is assumed that δ = 1. Total welfare in period
1 is equal to:
w∗1 = (φ
∗)2

v − 2
 1/2
0
tθdθ

+ φ∗ (1− φ∗)

v − 2
 1
0
tθdθ

− 2A (φ∗)
To simplify our analysis, we can write this equation as:
w∗1 = vφ
∗ − 1
4
φ∗t (4− 3φ∗)− 2A (φ∗)
Following the same reasoning, in the period 2, we need to take into account that price
discrimination makes some consumers buy ineﬃciently as some of them buy from the
least preferred ﬁrm. Second-period equilibrium welfare is equal to:
w∗2 = φ
∗ (1− φ∗)

v − 2
 1
0
tθdθ

+ v (φ∗)2 + (φ∗)2
−  ˆθA
0
tθdθ −
 θ1
ˆ
θA
t(1− θ)dθ

+(φ∗)2

− ˆθB
θ1
tθdθ −
 1
ˆ
θB
t(1− θ)dθ


Substituting the equilibrium values for
ˆ
θA ,
ˆ
θBand θ1, we obtain
w∗2 = vφ
∗ − t

φ∗ (1− φ∗) + 11 (φ
∗)2 + 8 (1− φ∗)
36

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Overall welfare is equal to W ∗ = w∗1 + w
∗
2, which simpliﬁes to
W ∗ = 2vφ∗ − t

φ∗ (1− φ∗) + 11 (φ
∗)2 + 8 (1− φ∗)
36
+
1
4
φ∗ (4− 3φ∗)

− 2A (φ∗) .
In equilibrium industry proﬁt under BBPD with advertising (and so with imperfect
information) is
Π∗ind =
34t
18
(φ∗ − 2)2 − 2A (φ∗) .
We can now compute overall consumer surplus using the fact that ECS∗ = W ∗−Π∗ind.
This simpliﬁes to:
ECS∗ = 2vφ∗ − 2
9
t

2φ∗2 − 26φ∗ + 35
Next we compare welfare, consumer surplus and industry proﬁts in diﬀerent scenarios,
for diﬀerent values of t and a taken into account the restriction imposed between t and
a derived in the equilibrium analysis of the no discrimination case which is a > t. Social
welfare without price discrimination (W nd), with price discrimination with advertising,
and thus with imperfect information (W ∗) and with price discrimination based on
perfect information(W p) is presented in table 1. Table 2 presents consumer surplus
and industry proﬁts for the same scenarios. In order to facilitate the analysis, welfare,
consumer surplus and equilibrium industry proﬁt computed assuming that v = 10.
41
Table 2: Social Welfare
t a φnd φ∗ W nd W ∗ W P
1 a = 1.5 0.89898 0.68806 1.2122 2.5410 19.444
1 a = 2 0.82843 0.63020 1.3726 2.7499 19.444
1 a = 3 0.73205 0.55221 1.6077 3.0445 19.444
1 a = 4 0.66667 0.5 1.7777 3.25 19.444
2 a = 2.5 0.9442 0.72554 2.2301 4.82 18.889
2 a = 3 0.89898 0.68806 2.4245 5.0820 18.889
2 a = 4 0.82843 0.63020 2.7451 5.4998 18.889
3 a = 3.5 0.96148 0.73985 3.2356 7.0827 18.333
3 a = 4 0.9282 0.71221 3.4463 7.3686 18.333
Table 3: Consumer Surplus and Industry Proﬁts
t a Πndind Π
∗
ind Π
P
ind ECS
nd ECS∗ ECSP
1 a = 1.5 1.2122 2.5410 1.8889 15.868 9.7485 17.556
1 a = 2 1.3726 2.7499 1.8889 13.196 8.2909 17.556
1 a = 3 1.6077 3.0445 1.8889 10.765 6.3214 17.556
1 a = 4 1.7777 3.25 1.8889 9.1112 5.0 17.556
2 a = 2.5 2. 2301 4.82 3.7778 13.323 6.8713 15.111
2 a = 3 2. 4245 5.0820 3.7778 11.959 5.7357 15.111
2 a = 4 2.7451 5.4998 3.7778 9. 8235 3.9777 15.111
3 a = 3.5 3.2356 7.0827 5.6667 11.150 3.5579 12.667
3 a = 4 3.4463 7.3686 5.6667 9.9793 2.5795 12.667
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Based on our numerical analysis we can establish the following results.
Proposition 10 As long as a > t, when we move from no discrimination to BBPD
with advertising:
(i) industry proﬁts increase;
(ii) consumer surplus falls down, and
(i) social welfare increases.
Proposition 11 As long as a ∈ R\

t(δ+3)
6

when we move from BBPD with perfect
information to BBPD with imperfect information:
(i) industry proﬁts increase;
(ii) consumer surplus falls down, and
(i) social welfare decreases.
Proposition 9 and 10 suggest that it is important to investigate the economic and
welfare eﬀects of price discrimination in markets with imperfect informed consumers.
While industry proﬁts decrease with BBPD in markets with perfect informed con-
sumers, the same might not occur under imperfect informed consumers. The simple
model developed shows that advertising might help ﬁrms to introduce imperfect in-
formation into the market which may act to soften price competition. As a result of
that BBPD with advertising might boost industry at the expense of consumer surplus.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
The economics literature on oligopoly price discrimination by purchase history is re-
latively new and has focused mostly on markets with perfectly informed consumers.
With the exception of Esteves (2009a) the possibility of ﬁrms being able to use advert-
ising as a way to transmit relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers has
not been considered. This dissertation has taken a step in investigating the impact of
Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination in markets where through the ﬁrms’ advertising
decisions consumers become imperfectly informed. That is, this thesis has provided
a ﬁrst study about the dynamic eﬀects of customer poaching in horizontally product
diﬀerentiated markets. We developed a two-period Hotelling model with BBPD and
informative advertising. In the second period ﬁrms can recognize their old and the
rival previous consumers and they may send them targeted ads with diﬀerent prices.
A relevant theme of this dissertation was the investigation of the eﬀects of BBPD
on ﬁrm’s advertising and pricing strategies and thus on proﬁts and welfare. It was
shown that being price discrimination permitted proﬁts are higher under imperfect
informed consumers than under fully informed consumers. More interesting are the
results obtained when we move from the benchmark case where ﬁrm advertise but
price discrimination is not permitted to the case with advertising and BBPD. We show
that BBPD boosts industry proﬁt and welfare at the expense of consumer surplus.
Thus, BBPD doesn’t necessarily lead to a prisioners’ dilemma situation. This suggests
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that in fact a good economic understanding of the eﬀects of BBPD should take into
account diﬀerent forms of market competition.
Appendix
This appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text.
Proof of Proposition 1: In period 1 ﬁrms simultaneously chooses prices and ad-
vertising levels. Each ﬁrm goal is to solve the following maximization problem:
max
pi,φi

(1 + δ)

piφi

1− φj

+ piφiφj

pj − pi + t
2t

− A (φi)

.
From the above problem we get the FOC with respect to pi given by equation (2.3)
which is:
pi =
1
2φj

2t− tφj + φjpj

.
As we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium it must be true that pi = pj = p
nd thus
pnd =
1
2φj

2t− tφj + φjpnd

pnd =
t

2− φj

φj
.
The FOC with respect to φi deﬁned in equation (2.4) is:
φi =
1
a
pi (δ + 1)

1− φj + φj

pj − pi + t
2t

.
Because the game is symmetric, we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium
φi = φj = φ
nd and pi = pj = p
nd

. The above equation simpliﬁes to:
t (δ + 1)
2a
=

φnd
2− φnd
2
.
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Solving this equation in order φnd we have:
φnd
2− φnd = ±
"
t (δ + 1)
2a
φnd =

2− φnd"t (δ + 1)
2a
∨ φnd = − 2− φnd"t (δ + 1)
2a
φnd = 2
"
t (δ + 1)
2a
− φnd
"
t (δ + 1)
2a
∨ φnd = φnd
"
t (δ + 1)
2a
− 2
"
t (δ + 1)
2a
φnd

1 +
"
t (δ + 1)
2a

= 2
"
t (δ + 1)
2a
∨ φnd

1−
"
t (δ + 1)
2a

= −2
"
t (δ + 1)
2a
φnd =
2

t(δ+1)
2a
1 +

t(δ+1)
2a
∨ φnd =
−2

t(δ+1)
2a
1−

t(δ+1)
2a
φnd =
2
1 +

2a
t(δ+1)
∨ φnd = 2
1−

2a
t(δ+1)
.
Since we obtain two solutions, it is important to impose that 0 < φnd ≤ 1. So, we
must verify in which circumstances the previous condition is valid. Starting with the
ﬁrst solution, it is obvious that φnd > 0. It is also straightforward to see that φnd ≤ 1,
iﬀ a ≥ t(δ+1)
2
.
Look now to the second solution, i.e., φnd = 2
1−

2a
t(δ+1)
. We observe that φnd > 0 iﬀ
a < t(δ+1)
2
and φnd ≤ 1 iﬀ a ≥ t(δ+1)
2
which is impossible. Thus, this solution doesn’t
satisfy the condition 0 < φnd ≤ 1. Therefore, the only valid solution is φnd = 2
1+

2a
t(δ+1)
as long as a ≥ t(δ+1)
2
. Replacing φnd by 2
1+

2a
t(δ+1)
into the equation pnd =
t(2−φnd)
φnd
we
obtain pnd =

2at
(δ+1)
.
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Proof of Corollary 1: Using the expression for overall proﬁt with no discrimination
and the quadratic advertising cost function, we have that:
Πnd = (1 + δ) pndφnd

2− φnd
2

− a

φnd
2
2
.
Using now the equilibrium solutions for pnd and φnd we obtain:
Πnd =
2 (1 + δ)

2at
(δ+1)
2

1 +

2a
t(1+δ)


2− 2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)


−a
2
 2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2
=
(1 + δ)

2at
(δ+1)
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)

2 + 2

2a
t(1+δ)
− 2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)


−a
2
 2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2
=
(1 + δ)

2at
(δ+1)
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)

 2

2a
t(1+δ)
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)

− a
2

 2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)

2
=
2 (1 + δ)

4a2t
t(1+δ)2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2 − a2
 2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2
=
4 (1 + δ)

a2
(1+δ)2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2 − a2

 2
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)

2
=
4a
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2 − 2a
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2
=
2a
1 +

2a
t(1+δ)
2 .
Proof of Proposition 4: We consider that ﬁrms discount future proﬁts by a factor
δ. Consider ﬁrst the case of ﬁrm A. A consumer located at θ is indiﬀerent between
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buying product A or B if θ =
p1
B
−p1
A
+t
2t
. Its overall proﬁt can be written as follow:
ΠA = π
1
A + δπ
2
A
where
π1A = p
1
AφA [(1− φB) + φBθ]−A (φA)
=
pA (6tφA + 2tδφB − 3tφAφB − 3φAφBpA + 3φAφBpB − tδφAφB)
6t+ 2tδ
−A (φA)
and
π2A =
2
9
tφB −
4
3
tφA +
5
9
tφAφB +
8
9
tφAθ
∗ − 8
9
tφBθ
∗
+
8
9
t
φA
φB
+
2
9
t
φA
φB +
10
9
tφAφB(θ
∗)2 − 10
9
tφAφBθ
∗.
As a remark notice that we are assuming the the ﬁrst period cutoﬀ is equal to
θ∗ =
tδ (2φB − 2φA + φAφB) + 3φAφB (t− p1A + p1B)
2tφAφB (δ + 3)
.
The derivate of overall proﬁt with respect to pA is
dπ1
A
dpA
+
dπ2
A
dpA
= 0 which can be
writen as:
dπ1A
dpA
+
dπ2A
dθ∗
dθ∗
dpA
= 0
where
dπ1A
dpA
=
6tφA + 2tδφB − 3tφAφB − 6φAφBpA + 3φAφBpB − tδφAφB
2t (δ + 3)
=
3tφA + tδφB − 32tφAφB − 3φAφBpA + 32φAφBpB − 12tδφAφB
t (δ + 3)
dπ2A
dθ∗
=
8
9
tφA −
8
9
tφB −
10
9
tφAφB +
20
9
tθ∗φAφB
dθ∗
dpA
= − 3
6t+ 2tδ
.
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Using the previous expression we have that:
dπ2A
dθ∗
dθ∗
dpA
=

8
9
tφA −
8
9
tφB −
10
9
tφAφB +
20
9
tθ∗φAφB

− 3
6t+ 2tδ

= −4φA − 4φB − 5φAφB + 10φAφBθ
∗
3δ + 9
= −4tφA − 4tφB − 2tδφA + 2tδφB − 5φAφBpA + 5φAφBpB
t (δ + 3)2
.
Therefore, from
dπ1
A
dpA
+
dπ2
A
dθ∗
dθ∗
dpA
= 0 it follows that:
0 =
1
3t+ tδ

3tφA + tδφB −
3
2
tφAφB − 3φAφBpA +
3
2
φAφBpB −
1
2
tδφAφB

− 1
t (δ + 3)2
(4tφA − 4tφB − 2tδφA + 2tδφB − 5φAφBpA + 5φAφBpB)
and so, the best-response price function of ﬁrm A with respect to pB is:
pA =
(1 + δ) t (10φA + 2δφB) + tφB (8− 9φA)− tδφAφB(δ + 6) + φAφBpB (3δ − 1)
φAφB (8 + 6δ)
.
Looking now at the FOC with respect to φA given by
∂ΠA
∂φA
= 0 we have:
dπ1A
dφA
+
dπ2A
dφA
= 0 which simpliﬁes to
dπ1A
dφA
+
dπ2A
dθ∗
dθ∗
dφA
= 0.
Using the fact that
dπ1A
dφA
= −pA (3tφB − 6t+ 3φBpA − 3φBpB + tδφB)
6t+ 2tδ
− aφA
= −pA (3φB (t+ pA − pB)− 6t+ tδφB)
6t+ 2tδ
− aφA,
dθ∗
dφA
= − δ
φ2A (δ + 3)
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and
dπ2A
dθ∗
dθ∗
dφA
=

8
9
tφA −
8
9
tφB −
10
9
tφAφB +
20
9
tθ∗φAφB

− δ
φ2A (δ + 3)

=
2δ
3φ2A (δ + 3)
2 (2t (2− δ) (φB − φA) + 5φAφB (pA − pB)) .
Therefore, from ∂ΠA
∂φA
= 0 we get:
aφA =
2δ (2t (2− δ) (φB − φA) + 5φAφB (pA − pB))
3φ2A (δ + 3)
2
−pA (3φB (t+ pA − pB) + t (δφB − 6))
2t (δ + 3)
.
from which we obtain ﬁrm A’s best-response advertising function given φj.
aφA =
2δ (2t (φA − φB) (δ − 2) + 5φAφB (pA − pB))
3φ2A (δ + 3)
2
−pA (−6t+ φB (3t+ 3pA − 3pB + tδ))
2t (δ + 3)
.
Symmetric expressions hold for ﬁrm B’s best-response functions:
pB =
(1 + δ) t (10φB + 2δφA) + tφA (8− 9φB)− tδφAφB(δ + 6) + φAφBpA (3δ − 1)
φAφB (8 + 6δ)
and
aφB =
2δ (−2t (φA − φB) (δ − 2)− 5φAφB (pA − pB))
3φ2B (δ + 3)
2
−pB (−6t+ φA (3t− 3pA + 3pB + tδ))
2t (δ + 3)
.
Since we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium it must be the case that pA = pB =
p and φA = φB = φ
∗. Evaluating both ﬁrms’ best resonse functions in the symmetric
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conditions it is easy to ﬁnd the ﬁrst period price and advertising equilibrium given by
p =
1
3φ∗
(6t+ 2tδ − 3tφ∗ − tδφ∗)
= t(1 +
δ
3
)

2− φ∗
φ∗

and
φ∗ =
t (6 + δ)−

t2δ2 + 72at
t (3 + δ)− 6a ∨ φ
∗ =
t (6 + δ) +

t2δ2 + 72at
t (3 + δ)− 6a .
Remember that the equilibrium level of advertising must satisfy the condition φ∗ ∈
]0, 1]. As we have two possible solutions we go now to prove that the solution φ∗ =
t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a satisﬁes the conditions φ
∗ > 0 and φ∗ ≤ 1.
Look ﬁrst at the condition φ∗ > 0. Next we study in which circumstances the
expression
t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a is positive. We have to take into account the sign of the
numerator and denominator simultaneously. The simplest process is to draw up a
framework where we study the sign of the numerator and denominator separately and
then the sign of the whole expression. Note that t > 0. The next computations show
that a = t
6
(δ + 3) is a zero of both the numerator and denominator.
6t+ tδ −

t2δ2 + 72at = 0
a = − 1
72t

t2δ2 − (6t+ tδ)2
a =
t
6
(δ + 3)
−6a+ 3t+ tδ = 0
a =
1
2
t+
1
6
tδ
a =
t
6
(δ + 3)
The next table studies the sign of the expression
t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a for values of t > 0.
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a 0 t
6
(δ + 3) +∞
6t+ tδ −

t2δ2 + 72at n.d. + 0 −
−6a+ 3t+ tδ n.d. + 0 −
6t+tδ−
√
t2δ2+72at
−6a+3t+tδ n.d. + n.d. +
From the table it is easy to see that follows that
t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a is positive iﬀ
a ∈ R/ t
6
(δ + 3)

. Looking now at the condition φ∗ ≤ 1, we have to solve the
inequality
t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a ≤ 1. To solve this inequality, one can rewrite the previous
inequality as
t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a − 1 ≤ 0, which simpliﬁes to:
6a+ 3t−

t2δ2 + 72at
t (3 + δ)− 6a ≤ 0.
Then, we ﬁnd zeros of the numerator and the denominator. From
6a+ 3t−

t2δ2 + 72at = 0
we have
a =
t
6
(3− δ) ∨ a = t
6
(δ + 3) .
From
−6a+ 3t+ tδ = 0
we obtain
a =
t
6
(δ + 3) .
Regarding the computation of the numerator’s zeros we need to take into account
that as we have an irrational equation, some caution is needed with the solutions
obtained. This is due to the square. Therefore we need to assess whether, in fact,
the two solutions obtained are solutions of the equation given. From the evaluation of
6a + 3t −

t2δ2 + 72at at the solution a = t
6
(3− δ) we obtain −2t (δ − 6) which is
diﬀerent from zero. Thus, a = t
6
(3− δ) is not solution of the equation.
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Likewise, from the evaluation of 6a+3t−

t2δ2 + 72at at the solution a = t
6
(3 + δ) ,
we ﬁnd that 6a+ 3t−

t2δ2 + 72at = 3t− t (δ + 6) + t (δ + 3) , which is in fact equal
to zero. Thus a = t
6
(3 + δ) is a solution of the equation. Therefore this equation has
only one solution given by a = t
6
(3 + δ).
Knowing the values that override the numerator and denominator, we move on to
build below a table of signs.
a 0 t
6
(δ + 3) +∞
6a+ 3t−

t2δ2 + 72at n.d. − 0 +
−6a+ 3t+ tδ n.d. + 0 −
6a+3t−
√
t2δ2+72at
−6a+3t+tδ n.d. − n.d. −
From this table it follows that for any a ∈ R/ t
6
(δ + 3)

it is always true that
φ∗ ≤ 1.
From the results of the two previous tables, we conclude that 0 < φ∗ ≤ 1 for any a ∈
R/

t
6
(δ + 3)

. Regarding the second solution for φ∗ given by φ∗ = t(6+δ)+
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a ,
the condition φ∗ > 0 implies that a < t
6
(δ + 3) and likewise to garante φ∗ ≤ 1 it must
be the case that a > t
6
(δ + 3), which is impossible. Thus, the only valid solution is
φ∗ = t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a .
Now we prove (ii). Notice that θ∗ =
tδ(2φB−2φA+φAφB)+3φAφB(t−p1A+p1B)
2tφAφB(δ+3)
. In a symmet-
ric it must be true that θ∗ (p1A, p
1
B) =
1
2
. Remember that the second period equilibrium
prices are given by:
pOA =
t [4 + φB (2θ
∗ − 3)]
3φB
pOB =
t [4 + φA (−2θ∗ − 1)]
3φA
pRA =
t [2 + φA (1− 4θ∗)]
3φA
pRB =
t [2 + φB (4θ
∗ − 3)]
3φB
.
Replacing in last conditions θ∗ by 1
2
and φ∗into φA and φB, and taking into account
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that pOA = p
O
B = p
O pRA = p
R
B = p
R we obtain that the second-period equilibrium prices
are
pO =
2t
3

2− φ∗
φ∗

pR =
t
3

2− φ∗
φ∗

.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 2: Using Proposition 4 we can now compute ﬁrm A over-
all proﬁt with BBPD. Remember that ΠA = π
1
A + δπ
2
A − A (φ∗) . Evaluating π1A =
pAφA [(1− φB) + φBθ]− A (φA) at p∗ and φ∗ we have that:
π1A = p
∗φ∗

(1− φ∗) + 1
2
φ∗

− A (φ∗)
=
1
2
φ∗ (p∗(2− φ∗))− A (φ∗)
Doing the same to π2A we obtain:
π2A =
2
9
tφ∗ − 4
3
tφ∗ +
5
9
t (φ∗)2 +
8
18
tφ∗ − 8
18
tφ∗ +
8
9
t+
2
9
t+
10
36
t (φ∗)2 − 10
18
t (φ∗)2
=
5
18
t (φ∗ − 2)2
In sum, the overall objective function is
ΠA =
1
2
φ∗ (p∗(2− φ∗)) + 5δ
18
t (φ∗ − 2)2 −A (φ∗)
Thus, each ﬁrm overall proﬁt with BBPD with advertising equals
Π∗ =
t
18
(φ∗ − 2)2 (8δ + 9)− A (φ∗)
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Proof of Proposition 5: In order to compare φ∗ = t(6+δ)−
√
t2δ2+72at
t(3+δ)−6a and φ
nd =
2
1+

2a
t(1+δ)
we can start with the hypothesis that φ∗ < φnd, and investigate whether this
condition is true or false. For simplify let us consider δ = 1. Then from φ∗ < φnd we
obtain:
√
t2 + 72at− 7t
6a− 4t <
2
a/t+ 1
which simpliﬁes to
√
t2 + 72at− 7t a/t+ 1− 2 (6a− 4t)
(6a− 4t)

a/t+ 1
 < 0
Determining the roots of the numerator we obtain
√
t2 + 72at− 7t

a/t+ 1

− 2 (6a− 4t) = 0
a =
2
3
t
Doing the same for the denominator:
(6a− 4t)

a/t+ 1

= 0
a =
2
3
t
After verifying that t = 3
2
a is in fact a solution of both expressions we can write
the following table:
a 0 2
3
t +∞√
t2 + 72at− 7t a/t+ 1− 2 (6a− 4t) n.d. − 0 +
(6a− 4t)

a/t+ 1

n.d. + 0 −
(
√
t2+72at−7t)
√
a/t+1

−2(6a−4t)
(6a−4t)
√
a/t+1
 n.d. − n.d. −
We ﬁnd therefore ﬁnd that φnd > φ∗ as long as a ∈ R\2t
3

. As φnd is deﬁned
as long as a ≥ t the previous condition is always true. This completes the proof that
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φnd > φ∗.
Proof of Proposition 6: Now we look at the behaviour of both second period prices
as we move from no discrimination to discrimination. Notice that from proposition 4 we
have pO = 2t
3

2−φ∗
φ∗

and pR = t
3

2−φ∗
φ∗

. From proposition 1 we have pnd = t

2−φnd
φnd

.
In order to compare second-period prices with price discrimination with second-period
prices with no discrimination we solve the following inequalities pO < pnd and pR <
pnd.
From pO < pnd we obtain:
2t
3

2− φ∗
φ∗

< t

2− φnd
φnd

We already know from proposition 5 that φnd > φ∗. To simplify the computations
we consider φ∗ = x e φnd = x + ε, where ε −→ 0. Therefore, we can rewrite the last
inequality in the following way
2t
3

2− x
x

< t

2− x− ε
x+ ε

2
3

2− x
x

<

2− x− ε
x+ ε

4
3x
− 2
3
−

2
x+ ε
− ε
x+ ε
− x
x+ ε

< 0
1
3x (x+ ε)

4ε− 2x+ xε+ x2 < 0
As ε −→ 0 the previous expression simpliﬁes to
(x− 2)
3x
< 0
Since x ∈ ]0, 1] the previous expression is always negative. This proves that pO < pnd.
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Similarly, we can prove that pR < pnd. We obtain that
t
3

2− φ∗
φ∗

< t

2− φnd
φnd

t
3

2− x
x

< t

2− x− ε
x+ ε

t
3

2− x
x

− t

2− x− ε
x+ ε

< 0
As ε −→ 0 the previous expression simpliﬁes to

−2t
3

2− x
x

< 0
As

2−x
x

is always positive and
−2t
3

is always negative the previous inequality is
always true. This completes the proof that pR < pnd. 
Proof of Proposition 7: Here we prove that p1 > p
nd
1 . Using the fact that p
1 =
t(1 + δ
3
)

2−φ∗
φ∗

and pnd1 = t

2−φnd
φnd

consider as an hypothesis that p1 > pnd1 . From
p1 − pnd1 > 0 we have
t(1 +
δ
3
)

2− φ∗
φ∗

− t

2− φnd
φnd

> 0
Since φnd > φ∗, consider that φ∗ = x e φnd = x + ε, where ε −→ 0. Therefore, we can
rewrite the last inequality as follows:
t(1 +
δ
3
)

2− x
x

− t

2− x− ε
x+ ε

> 0
As ε −→ 0 the previous expression simpliﬁes to
tδ
3

2− x
x

> 0
As

2−x
x

and tδ
3
are always positive the previous inequality is always true. This
proves that p1 > pnd1 for any φ ∈ ]0, 1].
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Proof of Proposition 8: Look ﬁrst on ﬁrst-period equilibrium proﬁts with and
without discrimination.
Using the expression of π∗1 and the equilibrium level of advertising with discrimin-
ation we have:
π∗1 = pφ
∗ [(1− φ∗) + φ∗θ]−A (φ∗)
= pφ∗

(1− φ∗) + 1
2
φ∗

−A (φ∗)
= t(1 +
δ
3
)

2− φ∗
φ∗

φ∗

(1− φ∗) + 1
2
φ∗

− A (φ)
=
t
2
(φ∗ − 2)2

1
3
δ + 1

− A (φ∗) .
Doing the same for the no-discrimination case:
πnd1 =
1
2
pφ

2− φnd− A φnd
=
t
2

2− φnd2 −A φnd
Consider for instance as an hypothesis that π∗1 < π
nd
1 . It follows that:
t
2
(φ∗ − 2)2

1
3
δ + 1

− A (φ∗) < t
2

2− φnd2 −A φnd (4.1)
As we already prove on proposition 5 that it is always true that φnd > φ∗ and
∂A(φ)
∂φ
> 0 then it is always true that A (φ∗) < A

φnd

. Thus it is always true that
t
2
(φ∗ − 2)2

1
3
δ + 1

− A (φ∗) < t
2

2− φnd2 − A (φ∗) .
Then from the previous equation it follows that
t
2
(φ∗ − 2)2

1
3
δ + 1

<
t
2

2− φnd2 .
To simplify consider φ∗ = x and φnd = x+ ε, where ε −→ 0.
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t2
(x− 2)2

1
3
δ + 1

<
t
2
(2− x− ε)2
t
2
(x− 2)2

1
3
δ + 1

− t
2
(2− x− ε)2 < 0
1
6
t

δx2 − 6xε− 4δx− 3ε2 + 12ε+ 4δ < 0
δx2 − 6xε− 4δx− 3ε2 + 12ε+ 4δ < 0
As ε is close to zero, it follows that
δx2 − 4δx+ 4δ < 0
δ (x− 2)2 < 0
As δ > 0 the previous inequality is always false. Thus, it is always true that π∗1 > π
nd
1 .
Look now on second-period proﬁts We know that
π∗2 =
5
18
t (2− φ∗)2
and
πnd2 =
t
2

2− φnd2
Assuming as an hypothesis that π∗2 > π
nd
2 :
5
18
t (2− φ∗)2 > t
2

2− φnd2
Take into account that φ∗ < φnd. Using the fact that φ∗ = x and φnd = x + ε,
where ε −→ 0, we can write the inequality as follows:
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t (2− x)2 > t
2
(2− x− ε)2
5
18
t (2− x)2 − t
2
(2− x− ε)2 > 0
− 1
18
t

4x2 + 18xε− 16x+ 9ε2 − 36ε+ 16 > 0
4x2 − 16x+ 18xε+ 9ε2 − 36ε+ 16 < 0
As ε −→ 0, we have that
4x2 − 16x+ 16 < 0
4 (x− 2)2 < 0
It is evident that the inequality is always false. Thus, it is always true that π∗2 < π
nd
2 .

Proof of Proposition 9: From corollary 2 we know that for any δ ∈ ]0, 1] , overall
equilibrium proﬁt under BBPD with advertising is equal to Π = t
18
(φ∗ − 2)2 (8δ + 9)−
A(φ∗) while overall equilibrium proﬁt without BBPD is given byΠnd = t
2

2− φnd2 (1 + δ)−
A

φnd

.
Assume as an hypothesis that Π < Πnd. Thus:
t
18
(φ∗ − 2)2 (8δ + 9)− A(φ∗) < t
2

2− φnd2 (1 + δ)− A φnd
As we already prove it is always true that φnd > φ∗ and ∂A(φ)
∂φ
> 0 then it is always
true that A (φ∗) < A

φnd

. Thus it is always true that:
t
18
(φ∗ − 2)2 (8δ + 9)− A(φ∗) < t
2

2− φnd2 (1 + δ)− A (φ∗)
Therefore,
t
18
(φ∗ − 2)2 (8δ + 9) < t
2

2− φnd2 (1 + δ)
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Assuming that φ∗ = x e φnd = x+ ε, where ε −→ 0,we have
t
18
(x− 2)2 (8δ + 9)−

t
2
(2− x− ε)2 (1 + δ)

< 0⇔
− 1
18
t

4δ − 36ε− 4xδ + 18xε+ 9ε2 − 36δε+ x2δ + 9δε2 + 18xδε < 0
− 1
18
t

4δ − 4xδ + x2δ < 0
− 1
18
tδ (x− 2)2 < 0
which for t > 0 and δ > 0 is always false. Therefore, the condition Π > Πnd is always
true. 
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